Epilogue: the “optional” unconscious by Sonu Shamdasani
In the course of the nineteenth century, concepts of consciousness underwent a transformation as competing concepts of unconscious mental functioning were developed in philosophy, physiology, biology, and psychology and psychical research in Europe and the United States.
The papers in this volume have mainly traced trajectories of concepts of the unconscious in nineteenth-century German philosophical and literary thought. Alongside these philosophical developments, concepts of the unconscious were developed in other disciplines.
For example, in nineteenth-century British physiology, this took place through an expansion of the concept of reflex action. Under the rubric of “unconscious cerebration,” William Carpenter (1813–85) maintained that a large proportion of mental activity takes place automatically, which is to say unconsciously.
At the same time, notions of organic memory arose in German biology, based on Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s (1744–1829) theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and Ernst Haeckel’s (1834–1919) biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny.
Through figures such as the German physiologist Ewald Hering (1834–1918), trans-individual and collective concepts of the unconscious were developed, wherein the unconscious was seen to contain and transmit the history of the race.
However, the most lasting legacy of these developments lay in the dynamic psychologies and psychotherapies of the twentieth century. As the basis for an explanation of psychopathology, the term was taken up for a while in twentieth-century psychiatry, and more widely within psychotherapy.
It became a means of explaining human behavior in general and a new source for self-knowledge, which increasingly came to signify knowledge of what was unconscious, in some shape or form, to the self.
The unconscious demonstrates the manner in which psychological concepts, despite their disputed status, have been taken on by large sectors of contemporary Western societies and entered the vernacular.
Elsewhere, I have reconstructed the history of these multiple formations, and some of their complex intersections. Drawing upon these works, I intend here to reflect upon the status of these concepts.¹
Any consideration of the history of the unconscious is indebted to Henri Ellenberger’s monumental Discovery of the Unconscious (1970).² Ellenberger’s text marked the constitution and delineation of a new field of enquiry.
His central assumption is embedded in the title of his work. As Mark Micale aptly notes, for Ellenberger, “the unconscious mind was not invented, or formulated, it was ‘discovered.’”³
For Ellenberger, the reality and existence of the unconscious as a natural object was unquestioned, with different conceptions of the unconscious figuring as competing maps of a preexisting and ontologically secure terrain.
A singular reality was supposed to underlie the multiple depictions. However, to grasp the historical constitution of the unconscious, such naturalism needs to be set aside.
Without this suspension, the modes in which the unconscious came to be conceived of as a natural object, whose existence could simply be taken for granted, cannot be grasped.
At the end of the nineteenth century, many figures in the West sought to establish a scientific psychology that would be independent of philosophy, theology, biology, anthropology, literature, medicine, and neurology, whilst taking over their traditional subject matters.
The very possibility of psychology rested upon the successful negotiation of these disciplinary crossings. The larger share of the questions that psychologists took up had already been posed and elaborated in these prior disciplines.
They had to prise their subjects from the preserves of other specialists. Through becoming a science, it was hoped that psychology would be able to solve questions that had vexed thinkers for centuries, and to replace superstition, folk wisdom, and metaphysical speculation with the rule of universal law.
The result would amount to nothing less than the completion and culmination of the scientific revolution.
A critical mutation occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, during which conceptions of the unconscious became the basis for dynamic psychologies.
Psychologists and philosophers were concerned with the questions that were posed by hypnosis, dreams, glossolalia, fugues, automatic writing, maladies of memory, hallucinations, telepathy and other alterations of the personality that seemed to pose formidable problems for the philosophy and psychology of consciousness.
In 1890, whilst reflecting on the future of science, the French philosopher Ernst Renan (1823–92) stated:
In studying the psychology of the individual, sleep, madness, delirium, somnambulism, hallucination offer a far more favourable field of experience than the normal state. Phenomena, which in the normal state are almost effaced because of their tenuousness, appear more palpable in extraordinary crises because they are exaggerated … human psychology will have to be constructed by studying the madness of mankind.⁴
A general reordering of the relations between the normal and the pathological, the regular and the irregular took place at this time, which was constitutive of modern psychology.
For the dynamic psychologies that flourished, the term that was most frequently used to conceptualize such states was the unconscious.
In 1890, Eduard von Hartmann wrote of its advent that:
it was in the air and prepared from all sides; furthermore, it was also a requirement of the progress of the self-consciousness and self-understanding of mankind, and only because it was all this could it find such a quick and favourable acceptance with the public, so that one can now almost hear the sparrows chirping about it from the rooftops.⁵
That same year, with characteristic prescience, William James (1842–1910) noted what was to bedevil the use of the term.
He wrote of the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, that “it is the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling ground for whimsies.”
For the dynamic psychologies, the concept of the unconscious was intended to carry the aspirations of their “will to science,” and the attempt to form a unitary discipline of psychology.
In this regard, the unconscious presented an ideal term. It was a site where new universal laws could be discovered and where periodic tables could be established.
It enabled them to delineate their own domain of the mind and people it with a plethora of objects, mechanisms, and special modes of functioning, described in a language modeled after the technical languages of the natural sciences.
There was little that could not be explained via the unconscious: dreams, delusions, passions, inspirations, and even religious experience.
The unconscious of the psychologists had to be differentiated from that of the philosophers, to enable it to be presented as a scientific concept.
In most cases, this was simply accomplished through a denial of filiation. Consequently, Hartmann’s philosophy of the unconscious came in for extended criticism from psychologists.
Physiologists were also at pains to differentiate their conceptions of the unconscious from Hartmann’s.
A case in point is the German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), whose 1885 work On Memory (Über das Gedächtnis) was critical in establishing the experimental investigation of memory, and who wrote his 1873 dissertation as a critique of Hartmann’s work.
Ebbinghaus contended that what was true in Hartmann’s book was not new, what was new in it was not true. Everything essential in it went back to Schopenhauer.⁷
In 1889, the American psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) subjected the concept of the unconscious to a critique in his Handbook of Psychology: Sense and Intellect.⁸
Von Hartmann’s views were simply dismissed for being metaphysical. Baldwin concluded:
Phenomena called “unconscious mental states” may be accounted for partly from the physical side, as excitations inadequate to a mental effect, and partly from the mental side, as states of least consciousness. Where, in the progressive subsistence of consciousness, these two classes of fact come together we have no means of knowing … As Binet says, if there be unconscious mental phenomena, “we know absolutely nothing about them.” ~Epilogue: the “optional” unconscious by Sonu Shamdasani Thinking the Unconscious, pp. 287–290
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